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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Imagine that you and your friend are approached by an FBI agent who extends an 
invitation to discuss, review and take notes on the potential civil liberty, privacy and civil rights 
concerns of the agency’s Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide.  This invitation, 
however, is just meant for your friend.  Moreover, when you later request to see the portions of 
the document that your friend analyzed for the FBI, the court determines that the Guide is the 
government’s exclusive property. 1   
Or consider this, you and that same friend decide to attend a highly publicized criminal 
trial, but at the last minute, something comes up and you are unable to attend.  That day, the 
government shows sensitive photographs to all those in attendance in the courtroom.  Your 
access to viewing those photographs, unfortunately, is later foreclosed when the court determines 
that the photographs are the government’s exclusive property.2  Should your access, as a citizen, 
to confidential government documents come down to “being in the right place, at the right time?”  
Should there be any circumstances where the government has waived this exclusive right?   
Finally, consider the following, you import merchandise into the U.S.  One of your 
competitors has his shipment seized by the U.S. Bureau of Customs and Border Protection, on 
that basis that the merchandise may be potentially infringing on a U.S. trademark.
3
  After hearing 
of his predicament, you suddenly realize that when the CBP seized his merchandise, your 
competitor was required to fill out a form which required him to disclose intimate aspects of his 
business.  Further, you know that the CBP, as required by law, then sent a notice of the seizure to 
                                                 
1
 See Muslim Advocates v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 2011 WL 5439085, Civil Action No. 09—1754 (D.C. Cir. 2011).   
2
 See Inner City Press/Cmty on the Move v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 463 F.3d 239 (2d. Cir. 
2006). 
3
 See Watkins v. U.S. Bureau of Customs and Border Protection, 643 F.3d 1189 (9th Cir. 2011).   
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the trademark owner, thereby disclosing the intimate aspects of your competitor’s business to a 
private third party.  From your competitor’s misfortune, you see a golden opportunity to get the 
competitive edge over him, so you file a FOIA request to get that form.  The CBP denies your 
request, claiming it contains confidential information and is therefore, the government’s 
exclusive property.  On appeal, under one jurisdiction, the court affirms the denial.  In another 
jurisdiction, however, the court reverses the denial, concluding that by giving it to the trademark 
owner, the government waived its confidentiality.  Which decision was correct?  What about if at 
the same time the court was affirming the denial, the trademark owner was faxing a copy of the 
form to you?  Would your answer change in any way?   
The Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA” or “Act”), codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552, “is a law 
that gives [the public] the right to access information from the federal government.”4  This right 
of access, however, is not absolute.
5
  In particular, a federal agency may exercise its discretion 
and withhold this information “pursuant to one of the nine enumerated exemptions listed in § 
552(b).”6  In limited situations, however, the court may determine that the confidentiality the 
exemption seeks to protect has been waived through some prior disclosure.
7
   
Given the role the FOIA is purported to play in upholding the principles of governmental 
transparency and accountability, the determination of waiver is particularly significant.  
Specifically, the finding of waiver serves as a plaintiff’s last chance at obtaining the protected 
material in a FOIA proceeding.  The standard that the court uses, therefore, is not only highly 
                                                 
4
 FOIA.GOV, http://www.foia.gov/ (last visited Oct. 21, 2011). 
5
 See Freedom of Information Act, 42 U.S.C. § 522(b)(1)-(9) (1966).   
6
 U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Julian, 486 U.S. 1, 8 (1988).    
7
 DEP’T OF JUSTICE, WL 3775089, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT GUIDE: DISCRETIONARY DISCLOSURE AND 
WAIVER 1 (2004).   
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relevant to the plaintiff’s case against the government, but serves as a platform to reinforce the 
principles underlying FOIA.   
While “[t]here are some well-established rules for determining whether an agency has 
waived its right to use FOIA exemptions with regard to requested information,” the federal court 
of appeals are not uniform in their implementation of these rules.
 8
   Moreover, some circuits 
have expressly adopted their own judicially-constructed legal doctrines in order to make a waiver 
determination.   
Most notably, the D.C. Circuit has adopted the “public domain doctrine” for determining 
whether the government has waived confidentiality under FOIA.
9
  Under the public domain 
doctrine, “the party advocating disclosure bears the initial burden of production…[and] must 
point to specific information in the public domain that appears to duplicate that being 
withheld.”10   
Additionally, the Tenth Circuit, while not expressly adopting the public domain doctrine, 
indicated that the doctrine is only of limited use to a plaintiff.  The court held that the application 
of “[t]he public domain doctrine is limited and applies only when the applicable exemption can 
no longer serve its purpose.”11  The court determined that since “the public domain doctrine 
appears nowhere in the statutory text of FOIA, only the failure of an express exemption to 
provide any protection of the interests involved could justify its application.”12   
                                                 
8
Id.    
9
 See Cotton v. Reno, 193 F.3d 550 (D.C. Cir. 1999).   
10
 Id. at 552.   
11
 Prison Legal News v. Exec. Office for U.S. Att’ys, 628 F. 3d 1243, 1253 (10th Cir. 2011).   
12
 Id.    
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The Ninth Circuit, conversely, held that the public-domain doctrine “should not be the 
only test for government waiver.”13  The court then articulated a new formula, the “no-strings-
attached” disclosure standard, for determining waiver.14  Under the no-strings-attached standard, 
an agency has waived its right to claim an exemption to a FOIA request when it “freely discloses 
to a third party confidential information covered by a FOIA exemption without limiting the third-
party’s ability to further disseminate the information.”15   
This Comment will assert that having multiple standards for determining waiver does not 
fully capture the important goals and substantial competing values underlying FOIA.  While 
seemingly minor relative to the breadth of subject matter in FOIA litigation, the reformation of 
waiver doctrine is a small, but nonetheless important step towards reclaiming the original 
principles of accountability and transparency.  The need for consistency and uniformity in 
judiciary adoption of waiver analysis is especially significant in FOIA litigation because of “the 
potential costs of an ill-advised FOIA disclosure,” the consequences of a shift in judicial 
deference of agency discretion,
16
 and the relationship between technology and the public domain.  
Part II will discuss the role of FOIA and an overview of the respective positions of the circuit 
courts on agency waiver.  Part III discusses the current legal landscape of FOIA and how the 
various waiver methodologies may be indicative of underlying issues within FOIA itself.  
Finally, Part IV will propose a substantive rule for guiding the decision-making process of the 
judiciary when it makes prior disclosure decisions.    
                                                 
13
 Watkins v. U.S. Bureau of Customs and Border Protection, 643 F.3d 1189, 1197 (9th Cir. 2011).   
14
 Id.  
15
 Id. at 1198.    
16
 David E. Pozen, The Mosaic Theory, National Security, and the Freedom of Information Act, 115 YALE L.J. 628, 
667 (2005).   
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II.  THE HISTORY OF THE ACT, WAIVER, AND THE CIRCUIT SPLIT 
 
A. The Freedom of Information Act  
In 1966, Congress passed the Freedom of Information Act in response to the ineffectual 
public disclosure section of the Administrative Procedures Act of 1946.
17
  The Act was the first 
federal statute to create an enforceable right of public access to executive branch information.
18
  
This enforceable right was intended “to ensure an informed citizenry, vital to the functioning of a 
democratic society, needed to check against corruption and to hold the governors accountable to 
the governed.”19   
Under this Act, a federal agency is required to disclose agency records unless properly 
withheld pursuant to an exemption listed in § 552(b).
20
  In enacting FOIA, “Congress carefully 
structured nine exemptions from the otherwise mandatory disclosure requirements in order to 
protect specified confidentiality and privacy interests.”21   
In 1974, following the discovery of corruption in the executive branch in the Watergate 
scandal, Congress amended the Act, thereby reiterating that FOIA was intended to pierce the veil 
of administrative secrecy.  Most notably, the amendment made FOIA more user-friendly and 
“ensured the availability of de novo review by courts of FOIA appeals by specifically authorizing 
courts to review documents in camera to ensure proper classification.”22 
                                                 
17
 Id. at 628.   
18
 Id. at 634.   
19
 N.L.R.B. v. Robbins Tire and Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 242 (1978).   
20
 U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Julian, 486 U.S. 1, 8 (1988).    
21
 437 U.S. 214, 220-221 (1978).   
22
 Veto Battle 30 Years Ago Set Freedom of Information Norms, The National Security Archive, 11/23/2004, 
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchive/NSAEBB/NSAEBB142/index.htm (citing EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73 (1973)).   
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In a FOIA proceeding, the government has the burden of persuasion.  The government 
has the burden of showing that one of the exemptions applies to the information denied.
23
  In 
limited circumstances, however, an agency is foreclosed from claiming an applicable 
exemption.
24
  In particular, an agency has waived its right to invoke the exemption if the 
information sought has been previously disclosed.
25
   
“The inquiry into whether a specific disclosure constitutes waiver is fact specific.”26  In 
determining whether an agency has waived its right, a reviewing court is required to conduct “a 
careful analysis of the circumstances surrounding the prior disclosure, including its extent, 
recipient, justification, and authorization.”27 
B.  Waiver Doctrine  
There are some well-established rules for determining waiver.  First, waiver only applies 
to information which has been “officially” released.  “To have been officially released[,] 
information generally must have been disclosed under circumstances in which an authoritative 
government official allowed the information to be made public.”28  This means, however, that 
when the disclosure was “not fairly attributable to the agency—i.e., when an agency employee 
has made an unauthorized disclosure, a ‘leak’ of information,” courts have found no waiver.29   
                                                 
23
 4 Admin. L. & Prac. § 14:25 (3d ed. 
24
MARK J. MEAGHER & TYSON J. BAREIS, THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT 6 (2010) 
25
 THE EFFECT OF PRIOR DISCLOSURE: WAIVER OF EXEMPTIONS, FOIA Update Vol. IV, No. 2 (1983), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/oip/foia_updates /Vol_IV_2/page6.htm. 
26
 Mobil Oil Corp. v. U.S. E.P.A., 879 F.2d 698, 701 (9th Cir. 1989). 
27
 THE EFFECT OF PRIOR DISCLOSURE: WAIVER OF EXEMPTIONS, FOIA Update Vol. IV, No. 2 (1983), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/oip/foia_updates /Vol_IV_2/page6.htm.  
28
 Id. (citing Myles-Pirzada v. Dep't of the Army, No. 91-1080, slip op. at 6 (D.D.C. Nov. 20, 1992); Frugone v. 
CIA, 169 F.3d 772, 774 (D.C. Cir. 1999)). 
29
 FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT GUIDE, Dep’t of Justice, WL 3775089, Discretionary Disclosure and Waiver 1 
(2004).   
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Similarly, courts have not found a waiver “when an agency makes an entirely mistaken 
disclosure of information.”30  However, when the prior disclosure is the result of the agency 
failing “to adhere to its own policies and regulations concerning disclosure of information 
contained within its records systems,” courts are more willing to find that a waiver has 
occurred.
31
     
Second, courts have imposed the burden of production on the party seeking disclosure.
32
   
Under this burden, courts have required a FOIA plaintiff to describe the information with a 
degree of specificity when claiming that information has already been previously disclosed.
33
  
This means that “[v]oluntary disclosures, either in whole or in part, to third parties…waives 
FOIA exemptions only for those documents released.”34  
 In the context of oral disclosure, courts have held that cases involving general or limited 
discussion of a subject, or sharing information with public in general terms do not result in a 
waiver.
35
  Moreover, a FOIA plaintiff’s personal knowledge of the exempt information is not a 
dispositive factor as to whether it was previously disclosed.
36
 
Third, courts have largely upheld the applicability of a FOIA exemption when the 
government is able to “demonstrate a legitimate purpose for the [prior] disclosure, and is able to 
establish that the disclosure was made with a restriction on further dissemination.”37  In 
evaluating the purpose for the prior disclosure, courts will typically defer “to the necessities of 
                                                 
30
   Id. 
31
 Id. 
32
 Id. 
33
 Id. 
34
 Mobil Oil Corp. v. U.S. E.P.A., 879 F.2d 698, 701 (9th Cir. 1989).  
35
 FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT GUIDE, Dep’t of Justice, WL 3775089, Discretionary Disclosure and Waiver 1 
(2004).   
36
 Id. 
37
 Id. 
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effective agency functioning when confronted with the issue of waiver.”38  This means that in 
circumstances involving substantial competing values, such as cases involving national security, 
law enforcement concerns, or where an individual’s privacy interest is at stake, courts are more 
willing to find that waiver has not occurred.
39
  Similarly, courts have generally not found a 
waiver “when an agency has been compelled to disclose a document under limited and controlled 
conditions.”40   
C.  The Public Domain Doctrine  
1.  Generally  
Due to informational asymmetries between the government and the public, “[t]he 
government has the power to keep much information secret.” 41  That secrecy, however, “ends 
when the information enters the public domain.” 42  “Once the information is in the public 
domain, the people have unrestricted rights of access to it.” 43   
In effect, the public domain operates as a structural limit on the government’s power to 
use secrecy over its own conduct.  When information has entered the public domain, “[t]he 
government's interest in secrecy is outweighed by the free dissemination of the information once 
it is made public.”44   
Within the federal courts of appeal, only the Second and District of Columbia Circuits 
have explicitly adopted the public domain doctrine and applied it to waiver litigation.  As a legal 
                                                 
38
 Id. 
39
 Id. 
40
 Id.; Cf. Watkins v. U.S. Bureau of Customs and Border Protection, 643 F.3d 1189, 1199 (9th Cir. 2011) 
(discussed infra).   
41
 Edward Lee, The Public’s Domain: The Evolution of Legal Restraints on the Government’s Power to Control 
Public Access Through Secrecy or Intellectual Property, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 91, 126 (2003). 
42
 Id. 
43
 Id. 
44
 Id. 
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standard for waiver in FOIA litigation, the public domain requires “that the requester 
demonstrate that the withheld information has already been specifically revealed to the public 
and that it appears to duplicate that being withheld.”45  In effect, the public domain doctrine 
“limits the government’s ability to assert an exemption from disclosure.”46     
The archetypal example of an agency record that might fall under the public domain 
doctrine is information disclosed in an open court or as a part of judicial proceedings.
 47
  In 
particular, “[t]his includes the evidence admitted at trial, the trial transcripts, the parties’ briefs, 
and the court’s orders and opinions.”48   
Furthermore, in many instances of FOIA litigation, the public domain “coincides with a 
physical or geographical location where the information originates—open court proceedings.” 49  
This is the typical form of disclosure in waiver litigation because “[c]riminal trials and most 
court proceedings in this country are open to the public[,] [so] any member of the public who 
attends such proceedings can further disseminate what information was revealed in open 
court.”50   
2.  District of Columbia Circuit  
The D.C. Circuit was the first federal court of appeals to adopt the public domain 
doctrine.  The court, in Cotton v. Reno,
51
 discussed the role the doctrine played in determining 
whether the government had waived its right to withhold agency records pursuant to a FOIA 
                                                 
45
 Mobil Oil Corp. v. U.S. E.P.A., 879 F.2d 698, 701 (9th Cir. 1989) (quoting United States Student Ass’n v. CIA, 
620 F. Supp. 565 (D.D.C. 1985) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted)).   
46
 Edward Lee, The Public’s Domain: The Evolution of Legal Restraints on the Government’s Power to Control 
Public Access Through Secrecy or Intellectual Property, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 91, 136 (2003); See, e.g., Cotton v. Reno, 
195 F.3d 550 (D.C. Cir. 1999).   
47
 Id. 
48
 Id. 
49
 Id. at 124-125. 
50
 Id. 
51
 195 F.3d 550, (D.C. Cir. 1999). 
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exemption. In that case, the FOIA requester sought audio recordings which the agency had 
played in open court.
52
   
The court first stated that “under [the] public-domain doctrine, materials normally 
immunized from disclosure under FOIA lose their protective cloak once disclosed and preserved 
in a permanent public record.”53  The court reasoned that “[t]he logic of FOIA mandates that 
where information requested is truly public, then enforcement of an exemption cannot fulfill its 
purposes.”54  Moreover, the court noted that it “must be confident that the information is truly 
public and that the requester receives no more than what is publicly available before [the court] 
find a waiver.”55  Essentially, the requested information must be freely available.56 
Guided by this doctrine, the court then employed a burden-shifting inquiry in determining 
if the government had waived confidentiality.
57
  The court noted that the government at all times 
has the burden of persuasion to show that information is not subject to disclosure under FOIA.
58
  
Once the government has satisfied this burden, the requesting party has the burden of producing 
evidence showing that the exempt agency records have entered the public domain, and thereby 
shed their Exemption protection.
59
   
The court reasoned that the burden of production is on the requesting party “otherwise, 
the government would face the daunting task of proving a negative: that requested information 
                                                 
52
 195 F.3d 550, 552(D.C. Cir. 1999). 
53
 Cotton v. Reno, 195 F.3d 550, 554 (D.C. Cir. 1999).  
54
 Id. (quoting Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 169 F.3d 16, 19 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)).    
55
 Id. at 555. 
56
 Watkins v. U.S. Bureau of Customs and Border Protection, 643 F.3d 1189, 1199 (9th Cir. 2011) (Rymer, J., 
dissenting) (emphasis added)).  
57
 195 F.3d 550, 554 (D.C. Cir. 1999). 
58
 Inner City Press/Cmty on the Move v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 463 F.3d 239, 245 (2d. Cir. 
2006). 
59
 195 F.3d 550, 554 (D.C. Cir. 1999). 
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had not been previously disclosed.”60  Similarly, the D.C. Circuit in another case “reasoned that 
the burden of production should fall upon the requester because the task of proving the 
negative—that the information has not been revealed—might require the government to 
undertake an exhaustive, potentially limitless search."
61
   
To satisfy this burden, “the specific information sought must have already been disclosed 
and preserved in a permanent public record.”62  In the D.C. Circuit, the requesting party must 
produce evidence that demonstrates four factors to satisfy the requirements of the public domain 
doctrine.  First, the withheld information must have been officially released.  Second, the 
information must have entered the public domain.  Third, the information must “remain a part of 
the public domain.”63  In particular, a previously disclosed record must have been released to the 
general public.
64
  Moreover, “[t]hese requirements—‘release’ to the ‘general public’—are 
construed narrowly.”65  The Supreme Court has further limited the application of this doctrine by 
requiring the information to be freely available.
66
  Fourth, and finally, the party has the “burden 
of showing that there is a permanent public record of the exact portions he wishes.”67  Thus, the 
                                                 
60
 Id. 
61
 FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT GUIDE, Dep’t of Justice, WL 3775089, Discretionary Disclosure and Waiver 1 
(2004) (quoting Davis v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 968 F.2d 1276, 1279-82 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (internal quotation marks 
omitted)).    
62
 Students Against Genocide v. Dep’t of State, 257 F.3d 828, 836 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (quoting Cotton v. Reno, 193 
F.3d 550, 554 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks omitted)).     
63
 195 F.3d 550, 554 (D.C. Cir. 1999). 
64
 MARK J. MEAGHER & TYSON J. BAREIS, THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT 6 (2010) (citing Students Against 
Genocide v. Dep’t of State, 257 F.3d 828 (D.C. Cir. 2001)).   
65
 Id. 
66
 463 F.3d 239, 245 (2d. Cir. 2006) (quoting U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of Press, 
489 U.S. 749, 764 (1989)). 
67
 Cotton v. Reno, 195 F.3d 550, 554 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (quoting Davis v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 968 F.2d 1276, 1280 
(D.C. Cir. 1992)).   
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requesting party “must point[ ] to specific information in the public domain that appears to 
duplicate that being withheld.”68   
The D.C. Circuit has stated that the specificity requirement permits the court to “carefully 
tailor the [agency]’s disclosure duty to ensure that the [court] do[es] not jeopardize the legitimate 
privacy interests of innocent third parties.”69  The rationale is that by ordering disclosure, without 
requiring specificity as to the materials sought, “would [ignore] the injury that disclosure might 
cause innocent third parties.” 70  The D.C. Circuit has noted, however, that requiring the FOIA 
plaintiff to produce a hard copy version of the requested information would be purporting to hold 
form over substance.
71
   
Once the requesting party has satisfied his burden, the burden of production then shifts to 
the government.   “[I]t is up to the government, if it so chooses, to rebut the plaintiff’s proof by 
demonstrating that the specific…records identified have since been destroyed, placed under seal, 
or otherwise removed from the public domain.”72 
In 2001, the D.C. Circuit, in Students Against Genocide v. Dep’t of State,73 addressed the 
issue of whether the government waives confidentiality when the exempt information was 
officially disclosed to a third party.  In that case, the FOIA plaintiff sought agency records 
relating to human rights violations that had been partially disclosed to foreign officials.
74
   
The court held that the government had not waived confidentiality.  Because the official 
only displayed the records to the members in attendance, had retained custody of the records, and 
                                                 
68
 Id. (quoting Afshar v. Dep’t of State, 702 F.2d 1125, 1130 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
69
 Id. (quoting Davis v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 968 F.2d 1276, 1278 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
70
 Id. (quoting Davis v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 968 F.2d 1276, 1280 (D.C. Cir. 1992)).    
71
Id. at 555. 
72
 Id. at 556.   
73
 257 F.3d 828 (D.C. Cir. 2001).  
74
 Id. at 830. 
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the records never left the Security Council’s chambers, the court determined that the requested 
information was not released at all.”75  Moreover, the records were only viewed by the people in 
attendance, and thus, were not released to the general public.
76
  The court determined, therefore, 
that the records did not enter the public domain.   
In addition, the court determined that “there [was] no permanent public record of the 
[exempt records]” because the information sought had not been released into the public 
domain.
77
  In making this determination, the court noted that it was “significant that [the agency 
official] displayed, but did not distribute, the [records] in question” in evaluating the 
circumstances of the disclosure.
78
  
Furthermore, the government was found to have presented a legitimate reason for 
nondisclosure.  The court found that there was “nothing unreasonable in the government's 
contention that it may have affirmative foreign policy reasons for sharing sensitive information 
with some foreign governments and not others.”79  The court based its determination on the 
agency’s statements which claimed that this type of disclosure, as compared to public and 
permanent release of the documents, still enabled the enforcement of the exemption to fulfill its 
purposes.
80
  The court reasoned that given the plausibility of the government’s statements for 
nondisclosure, and absent a showing a bad faith, the court would accord a substantial amount of 
deference to the agency’s proffered injury resulting from court-mandated disclosure.81   
                                                 
75
 Id. 
76
 Id. 
77
 Id. (quoting Cotton v. Reno, 193 F.3d 550, 554 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted)).   
78
 Id. at 837.  
79
 Id.  
80
 Id.  
81
 Id.  
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The court then rejected the contention that by the agency previously disclosing the 
classified documents “to parties against whom the exemption was intended to provide protection: 
foreign governments,” the disclosure “represents merely a slight variation on the theme” 
underlying the public domain doctrine.
82
  In rejecting this argument, the court stated that the 
identity of the FOIA plaintiff was not relevant in determining whether waiver had occurred.
83
 
The court reasoned that “disclosure made to any FOIA requester is effectively a disclosure to the 
world at large.”84   
The court further noted that “courts lack authority to limit the dissemination of 
documents once they are released under FOIA, or to choose selectively among recipients.”85 The 
court therefore determined that it “must assume that if the requested [records] are released, they 
will eventually make their way to foreign governments and others who may have interests that 
diverge from those of the United States.”86  The court therefore held that the plaintiff failed to 
satisfy its burden of production under the public domain doctrine.   
In a recent decision on the issue of waiver, however, the District Court in the D.C. Circuit 
impliedly embraced a balancing approach in addition to using the public domain doctrine.
87
  
Under this balancing analysis, the court looked to additional factors in determining whether 
waiver of confidentiality had occurred.
88
  The significance of this decision is that the District 
Court found the public domain doctrine to be under-inclusive and presumably, an insufficient 
                                                 
82
 Id. at 836. 
83
 Id. 
84
 Id. 
85
 Id. at 836-837.  
86
 Id. at 837.  
87
 Muslim Advocates v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, CIV.A. 09-1754, 2011 WL 5439085, n. 8 (D.D.C. Nov. 10, 2011)  
88
 Id. 
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test for waiver.  The District Court’s approach, therefore, may be indicative of the inherent 
weaknesses of the public domain doctrine in addressing all of the plaintiff’s waiver arguments.    
3.  Second Circuit   
The Second Circuit has also adopted the public domain doctrine.  The court, in Inner City 
Press/Cmty on the Move v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.,
89
 weighed in on the 
application of the doctrine.  The court first noted that an “exemption does not apply if identical 
information is otherwise in the public domain.”90  The court then stated that the underlying 
rationale of the doctrine is sound.  In particular, the court noted that “if identical information is 
truly public, then enforcement of an exemption cannot fulfill its purposes.”91   
In Inner City, the court held that the requesting party failed to satisfy its burden of 
production because the requesting party did not demonstrate that the withheld information is 
likely duplicative of that in the public filings.
92
  The court, in the interest of judicial economy, 
then addressed the agency’s argument that even if the party satisfied its burden of production, the 
information is still not subject to disclosure under U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Committee 
for Freedom of Press.
93
   
In Reporters Committee, the Supreme Court held that a rap sheet compiling a person’s 
criminal history is not freely available and is not subject to disclosure.  The agency’s argument 
was that even if the record was in the public domain, it “is not freely available because of the 
logistical difficulties in locating it.”94   
                                                 
89
 463 F.3d 239, 245 (2d. Cir. 2006) 
90
 Id. at 244. 
91
 Id. 
92
 Id. at 251.   
93
 489 U.S. 749, (1989).   
94
 463 F.3d 239, 252 (2d. Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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The Second Circuit first noted that unlike the compilation of otherwise difficult to obtain 
information in Reporters Committee, a party seeking the agency records in this case only had to 
contact one government agency.
95
  Further, the court noted that the information could be 
accessed online, free of charge and was located on only one database.
96
   
The Second Circuit determined that “the information in this case remains much more 
freely available than in Reporters Committee.”97  Moreover, the court noted in footnote 15, that 
“[a]s technology quickly changes, information becomes more readily available to the public and 
the difficulties noted in Reporters Committee, for example, lessen significantly.”98   
The court then stated that the information sought in this case does not involve the same 
privacy concerns as that in Reporters Committee.
99
  The court held that “the ready availability of 
[the information sought] and the policy favoring disclosure of information found in [the 
information sought] distinguishes this case from Reporters Committee.”100  The court then 
remanded the case to the district court for the plaintiff to have the opportunity to fulfill its burden 
of production.
101
 
4.  Tenth Circuit 
The Tenth Circuit in Prison Legal News v. Exe. Office for U.S. Att’ys102 declined to apply 
the public domain doctrine.  The Tenth Circuit held that the application of the public domain 
doctrine would only be justified when the applicable exemption failed “to provide any protection 
                                                 
95
 Id. 
96
 Id. 
97
 Id. 
98
 Id. at 252, n.15 (“The rapid change in technology is evidenced here by the fact that a text search of securities 
filings became available during the pendency of this matter.”) (citing Appellee's Br. 58 n. 21)). 
99
 Id. at 252.  
100
 Id. at 245 (citing U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of Press, 489 U.S. 749, 764 (1989)). 
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 Id. 
102
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of the interests involved.”103  The plaintiff in the case claimed that the public domain doctrine 
applied because the information sought had been introduced as evidence and shown in open 
court to the jury and to the public audience.
104
 
In addressing whether the public domain doctrine found in Cotton v. Reno applied, the 
Tenth Circuit first noted that “[t]he justification for the D.C. Circuit’s [public domain doctrine] 
under FOIA’s statutory framework is critical to understanding when the doctrine applies.”105  
The court then stated that “[t]he D.C. Circuit explained that the logic of FOIA mandates that 
where information requested is truly public, then the enforcement of an exemption cannot fulfill 
its purposes.”106  
The court noted that “[o]nce the [records] in Cotton were played at a public trial, the 
purpose of the [relevant exemption] could no longer be fulfilled because the government had 
already revealed the intercepted information,” in contravention of an otherwise governing 
statute.
107
  Further, the court noted that “there was no argument in Cotton that any additional 
interest attached to the tape recordings.”108   
The court then determined that “the purpose of [the relevant exemption] in this case 
remains intact [because] the family’s strong privacy interest in the [records] is distinct from 
information about what those images and recordings contain.”109  Since the information sought 
was observed “by a limited number of individuals who were present in the courtroom at the time 
                                                 
103
 Id. at 1253 (emphasis added). 
104
 Id. at 1246. 
105
 Id. at 1252. 
106
 Id. at 1246 (10th Cir. 2011) (quoting Cotton v. Reno, 193 F.3d 550, 554 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (internal quotation 
marks omitted)).   
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of the trails[,] enforcement of [the relevant exemption] [could] still protect the [family’s] privacy 
interests.”110 
The court then stated that “[t]he public domain doctrine is limited and applies only when 
the exemption can no longer serve its purpose.”111  The court reasoned that because “the public 
domain doctrine appears nowhere in the statutory text of FOIA, only the failure of an express 
exemption to provide any protection of the interests involved could justify its application.”112   
Furthermore, the court reasoned that even if it adopted the public domain doctrine, the 
purpose of the relevant exemption could still be served.  Therefore, the doctrine would not have 
defeated the applicability of the exemption.
113
  Thus, the Tenth Circuit found the particular 
exemption involved in the case to be the dispositive factor in determining whether waiver had 
occurred through some prior disclosure.   
D.  No-Strings-Attached Standard 
The Ninth Circuit, in Watkins v. U.S. Bureau of Customs and Border Protection,
114
 
articulated a new standard as an alternative to public domain doctrine.
115
   In that case, a 
copyright and trademark attorney requested agency records concerning information about 
commercial importers.
 116
  The government, in responding to the request, provided him with 
heavily redacted documents, citing various FOIA exemptions.
117
   
                                                 
110
 Id.  at 1252-1253. 
111
 Id. 
112
 Id. (emphasis added). 
113
 Id. 
114
 643 F.3d 1189 (9th Cir. 2011). 
115
 Id. at 1197 (9th Cir. 2011). 
116
 Id. at 1192-1193 (9th Cir. 2011). 
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The FOIA litigant then claimed that the government had waived its ability to claim an 
exemption through prior disclosure.
118
  Specifically, the FOIA requester alleged that by 
disclosing the information about commercial importers to affected trademark owners, pursuant to 
a federal statute,
119
 the government waived the confidentiality of the agency records.
120
 
In determining whether the government had waived confidentiality, the court first noted 
that the public domain doctrine, while persuasive in most cases, does not reach the concerns of 
confidentiality in circumstances like those presented in this case.
121
  The court then distinguished 
this case from those that had applied the public domain on three bases.
122
  First, the information 
sought in this case did not involve high-level criminal investigations, or matters of national 
security.
123
  Second, the manner of prior disclosure in this case involved a scenario in which the 
government had already provided a no-strings-attached disclosure of the confidential information 
to a private third party.
124
  And lastly, the court determined that because the public domain 
doctrine required the information to be preserved in the public record, it was limited in scope.
125
   
The court reasoned that taken to its logical extreme, the public domain doctrine would 
still immunize the requested information even though the third party had the ability to freely 
disseminate that information in ways that would hypothetically compromise the purportedly 
sensitive information.
126
   
                                                 
118
 Id. at 1196 (In particular, when commercial importers make entry into the U.S., they are required to disclose 
specific information to the C.B.P.  Pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1526(e), the C.B.P. is then required to send “Notices of 
Seizure,” which contain the disclosed information from the commercial importers, to trademark owners.). 
119
 See 19 U.S.C. § 1526(e).   
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 643 F.3d 1189, 1197 (9th Cir. 2011). 
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 Id. at 1197-1198. 
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 Id. at 1197. 
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The court then articulated a new standard for determining waiver.  The court held that 
under the no-strings-attached disclosure standard, when an agency (1) freely discloses to a third 
party confidential information covered by a FOIA exemption, (2) without limiting the third-
party’s ability to further disseminate the information, then the agency waives the ability to claim 
an exemption to a FOIA request.
127
   
In the dissenting opinion, however, Judge Rymer stated that the court should have 
adopted the public domain doctrine “for waiver embraced by the D.C. Circuit and the Second 
Circuit.”128  Judge Rymer first noted that “adopting this test [would] put [the court] in line with 
other circuits.”  Further, Judge Rymer stated “unlike the majority’s retreat from the public 
domain [doctrine], it is a clear rule that can be applied without guesswork.”129   
Judge Rymer then rearticulated the public domain doctrine.
130
  Under the public domain 
doctrine, Judge Rymer determined that the “limited disclosure to interested third-parties [was] 
not otherwise in the public domain or freely available.”131  Judge Rymer concluded therefore that 
the government did not waive confidentiality.  
E.  The Significance of the Multifarious Approaches 
Recently, “FOIA has…been the subject of complementary criticism: not that it is 
unnecessary, but rather that it is ineffective.”132  In particular, it has been said that FOIA is “only 
as effective as courts say [it] [is], and the effectiveness of FOIA…has been undercut by [the] 
                                                 
127
 Id.  at 1198.  
128
 Id. at 1199 (Rymer, J., concurring in part, and dissenting in part).  
129
 Id.  
130
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 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted)).  
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 Seth F. Kreimer, The Freedom of Information and the Ecology of Transparency, 10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1011, 
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[variation] [in] judicial interpretation.” 133  Waiver litigation is one instance of this purported 
ineffectiveness.     
The different circuits, as noted above, have embraced and subsequently developed a 
variety of substantive standards in determining waiver.  The D.C. and Second Circuit have 
adopted a four-step inquiry, the public domain doctrine, to address waiver.
134
  The District Court 
in the D.C. Circuit, however, found the public domain doctrine to be insufficient in addressing 
prior disclosure of agency records.   
Conversely, the Tenth Circuit has declined to adopt the public domain doctrine, and in 
doing so, narrowed a FOIA plaintiff’s ability to use the doctrine.135  Moreover, the Ninth Circuit 
has developed a two-step inquiry, the no-strings-attached disclosure standard, for determining 
government waiver of confidentiality under certain circumstances.
136
   
 
III.  THE NEED FOR CONSISTENCY WITH CONTEMPORARY WAIVER DOCTRINE 
 
 
The judicial treatment of waiver doctrine, specifically the variety of legal tests and 
absence of any explicit adoption of particular factors, is indicative of underlying issues within 
FOIA itself.  In particular, FOIA has been criticized for being removed from the legislator’s 
original intent as a tool for the citizenry.  The judiciary, as the branch entrusted for the 
enforcement of FOIA, is necessarily implicated within this critique.   
                                                 
133
 David C. Vladeck, Information Access—Surveying the Current Legal Landscape of Federal Right-to-Know 
Laws, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1787, 1791 (2008).  
134
 Cottone v. Reno, 193 F.3d 550, 552 (D.C. Cir. 1999); Students Against Genocide v. Dep’t of State, 257 F.3d 828, 
836 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Inner City Press/Cmty on the Move v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 463 F.3d 
239, 245 (2d. Cir. 2006). 
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 Prison Legal News v. Exec. Office for U.S. Att’ys, 628 F.3d 1243, 1252 (10th Cir. 2011). 
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In order to perform its role under FOIA, the judiciary must appear legitimate.  Therefore, 
in the interest of accountability and transparency, the court should clearly and explicitly state 
their method of analysis and avoid relying on ambiguous legal jargon, such as “freely available,” 
“permanent public record,” and “public domain.”  Similarly, as the last chance at obtaining the 
classified record in FOIA litigation, the court should unequivocally state what types of factors 
they will be evaluating on the issue of waiver.   
Moreover, given the role the executive plays in determining disclosure policy, courts 
should be permitted to be flexible in evaluating the government’s proffered justification for the 
limited disclosure.  This flexibility in evaluating waiver in light of the government’s reason, 
however, must be done so explicitly in the interest of governmental transparency.  In addition, 
courts should be accorded a certain amount of flexibility in determining waiver because of the 
uncertain role of technology.   
A.  Legislative Intent  
The legislature is responsible for defining the scope of FOIA.  The legislature intended 
for FOIA, as a request-driven statute, to impose a broad presumption of openness on the 
government, and made “explicit that the Act’s nine limited bases for withholding information are 
exclusive.”137  The exemptions, therefore, serve “as a counterbalance to the Act’s broad 
disclosure provisions.”138 The issue of prior disclosure or waiver of confidentiality, however, is 
absent from both the text and legislative history of the FOIA.  Thus, the doctrine of confidential 
waiver originates from the judiciary.   
                                                 
137
 David C. Vladeck, Information Access—Surveying the Current Legal Landscape of Federal Right-to-Know 
Laws, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1787, 1798 (June 2008). 
138
 Seth F. Kreimer, The Freedom of Information and the Ecology of Transparency, 10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1011, 
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Notwithstanding the absence of clear congressional intent, the Ninth Circuit case of 
Mobile Oil Corp. v. U.S. E.P.A.,
139
 is instructive on the issue of legislative intent regarding 
waiver of confidentiality under FOIA.  In this case, the court examined the relationship between 
waiver and the policy considerations underlying FOIA’s statutory scheme.140   
The court first noted that implying a waiver based solely on an incident of prior 
disclosure, “could tend to inhibit agencies from making any disclosures other than those 
explicitly required by law because voluntary release of documents exempt from disclosure 
requirements would expose other documents in the litigation to risk of disclosure.”141  The court 
reasoned that “[a]n agency would have an incentive to refuse to release all exempt documents if 
it wished to retain an exemption for any documents.”142  Thus, the court held that “readily 
finding waiver of confidentiality for exempt documents would tend to thwart the underlying 
statutory purpose, which is to implement a policy of broad disclosure of government records.”143  
The court then addressed the basic policies behind FOIA’s exemption provisions.  The 
court first noted that “[t]he policy underlying the exemption of certain categories of documents 
from FOIA disclosure requirements is that legitimate governmental and private interests could be 
harmed by release of certain types of information.”144  The court then stated that the “[c]oncerns 
about forced disclosure of exempt materials are lessened when the agency voluntarily has 
released that specific information.”  The court therefore concluded that in determining whether 
                                                 
139
 879 F.2d 698 (9th Cir. 1989).   
140
 Id. at 701.  
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prior disclosure had resulted in waiver, “the concerns underlying the carving out of FOIA 
exemptions weigh heavily.”145   
The method used in judicial review should effectuate the intent of the legislature.  In 
particular, the standard for determining waiver should be tailored to ensure the effective 
operation of FOIA.  Moreover, the methodology should take into account the importance of 
governmental transparency, that exemptions are construed very narrowly, and that principles of 
governmental transparency necessitate agency cooperation.  In viewing the issue of waiver 
within the context of legislative intent, therefore, the more substantially supported conclusion is 
that the purpose of the applicable exemption must “weigh heavily” on the court’s analysis.   
B.  The Role of the Judiciary  
The principal aim of FOIA is to the strike the balance between the government’s interest 
in keeping certain information confidential with the public’s right to a transparent governmental 
body.
146
  The judiciary is in charge of maintaining this balance and is responsible for the 
enforcement of FOIA.
147
  It should be noted, however, that “[t]he role of the courts is not to 
usurp the function of an agency chief, but to weigh the strength of his arguments against those of 
the litigant requesting disclosure and determine whether the former has properly exercised his 
authority under the relevant law.”148  
In particular, “FOIA empowers the judiciary with full power of review so as to provide a 
check on the exercise of executive classification authority.”149  Judicial review of FOIA appeals, 
                                                 
145
 Id. at 702.   
146
 Scott A. Faust, National Security Information Disclosure Under the FOIA: The Need for Effective Judicial 
Enforcement, 25 B.C. L. REV. 611, 612 (1984). 
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therefore, “was explicitly sculpted to safeguard the principles of democratic self-government and 
good government.”150   
Because the judiciary was entrusted with balancing the public’s interest in disclosure and 
the government’s interest in confidentiality, the effectiveness of “FOIA depends heavily upon 
the courts’ performance of their assigned role.”151  When Congress amended FOIA in 1974, it 
included special procedures to be used in FOIA appeal proceedings, including the requirement of 
public affidavits, in camera inspection, and de novo review.
152
  In so authorizing these 
procedures, “the amendments aimed to fulfill FOIA’s underlying goal of ‘prevent[ing] [review] 
from becoming meaningless judicial sanctioning of agency discretion.’”153  Thus, it has been 
stated that “[t]he efficacy of FOIA…depends in substantial measure on the rigor and skepticism 
with which trial judges exercise their offices.”154   
Recently, however, the judiciary has been criticized for failing to perform its role as a 
check on the executive branch under FOIA.  In particular, courts have been viewed as being too 
deferential to the executive branch.
155
  Because “courts give the executive branch substantial 
deference in its classification decisions…, combined with Congressional inaction, has left the 
executive branch largely unchecked in matters relating to classified information.”156   
                                                 
150
 David E. Pozen, The Mosaic Theory, National Security, and the Freedom of Information Act, 115 YALE L.J. 628, 
671 (2005).   
151
 Scott A. Faust, National Security Information Disclosure Under the FOIA: The Need for Effective Judicial 
Enforcement, 25 B.C. L. REV. 611, 615 (1984). 
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 Id. at 620-621. 
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 Seth F. Kreimer, The Freedom of Information and the Ecology of Transparency, 10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1011, 
1050 (June 2008).  
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 See id.  
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 Amanda Fitzsimmons, National Security or Unnecessary Secrecy? Restricting Exemption 1 to Prohibit 
Classification of Information Already in the Public Domain, 4 INFO. SOC’Y J.L. & POL’Y 479, 487 (2008).  
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In remedying this disruption in the balance of the public and government’s competing 
interests, and thereby increasing their legitimacy in the eyes of the citizenry, the judiciary should 
assert its power to enforce the FOIA.  In the context of waiver adjudication, therefore, the 
judiciary should explicitly adopt a uniform, comprehensive approach to better protect the 
public’s right of access.   
The waiver doctrine, however, must not be mechanically applied.
157
  Instead, courts 
require a more adaptive standard in which to exercise their discretion in cases involving waiver.  
Because “rules constrain discretion, they are too inflexible and resistant to evolution over 
time."
158
  Similarly, given “[t]he patchwork of legislative and administrative measures that have 
affected public disclosure throughout the years,”159 the court should have the appearance of 
consistency, uniformity, and predictability when applying a method of waiver analysis.  
Therefore, if the standard for determining agency waiver should not be mechanically applied, 
and courts need to appear uniform and consistent, then the courts should explicitly adopt a 
balancing approach that considers a specific number of factors.  
C.  The Influence of the Executive  
The executive branch has been entrusted with the daily administration of the FOIA.  As 
noted above, “[FOIA] gives the public statutory rights of access to broad categories of 
government information unless it falls within an exemption.”160  Significantly, the classification 
process of governmental information has been relegated to the executive branch.  In other words, 
                                                 
157
 Chicago Alliance for Neighborhood Safety v. City of Chicago, 348 Ill. App. 3d 188, 202 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004).  
158
 Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 90 (November 1992).  
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 Robert Ratish, Democracy’s Backlog: The Electronic Freedom of Information Act Ten Years Later, 34 RUTGERS 
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the determination of whether the requested information falls within an exemption is left to the 
sole discretion of the agencies.   
 “Because of this discretion, disclosure policies can differ from agency to agency and 
even within constituent sections of a single agency.” 161  Moreover, changing political events, 
such as the transitional nature of presidential administrations or unforeseen national incidents, 
“can have a substantial effect on an agency's discretion when creating its disclosure policy.”162  
Therefore, the substantive and procedural elements of the Act are susceptible to political 
manipulation by the current administration.     
Pursuant to an Executive Order, a presidential memorandum on FOIA implementation 
provides the policy position regarding disclosure for that current administration.
163
  Further, the 
president then directs the Attorney General to issue new guidelines governing the FOIA to the 
heads of the executive departments and agencies.
164
  The Attorney General's power over agency 
discretion flows from the Department of Justice's almost exclusive authority to represent the 
United States, its agencies, and its officers in FOIA litigation. As a result, the Department of 
Justice is ultimately charged with defending any agency decision to withhold information.
165
  
In effect, the Attorney General’s guidelines “influence[ ] the policy on disclosure, resulting in 
modifications to the way government agencies handle requests.”166 
                                                 
161
 Amanda Fitzsimmons, National Security or Unnecessary Secrecy? Restricting Exemption 1 to Prohibit 
Classification of Information Already in the Public Domain, 4 INFO. SOC’Y J.L. & POL’Y 479, 492 (2008).  
162
 Id. 
163
 Peter M. Shane, The Obama Administration and the Prospects for a Democratic Presidency in a Post-9/11 
World, 56 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 27, 41 (2011/2012). 
164
 Id. 
165
 Amanda Fitzsimmons, National Security or Unnecessary Secrecy? Restricting Exemption 1 to Prohibit 
Classification of Information Already in the Public Domain, 4 INFO. SOC’Y J.L. & POL’Y 479, 492 (2008).  
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The relationship between political accountability and disclosure policies can be seen 
during the transitionary periods from the Clinton Administration to the Bush Administration, and 
from the Bush Administration to the Obama Administration.  Under the Clinton Administration, 
FOIA was seen as a vital part of democracy,
167
 “[t]he presumption was disclosure and agencies 
were encouraged…to release information.”168  Further, Attorney General Janet Reno’s 
memorandum stated that the DOJ would defend an asserted “FOIA exemption only in those 
cases where the agency reasonably foresees that disclosure would be harmful to an interest 
protected by that exemption.”169  
Conversely, under the Bush Administration, agencies were advised to fully consider any 
countervailing interests before making any discretionary disclosure under FOIA after the 
September 11th terrorists attack.
170
  Notably, Attorney General John Ashcroft’s memorandum 
recognized that while the DOJ and the Bush Administration were committed to complying with 
FOIA, they were equally committed to protecting other fundamental values, specifically 
safeguarding national security.
171
  The memorandum also indicated that the DOJ would defend 
an agency’s decision as long as the classification rested on a “sound legal basis.”172 
In a notable shift from the Bush Administration, President Barack Obama held that FOIA 
“should be administered with a clear presumption: In the face of doubt, openness prevails.”173  
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President Barack Obama also stated in his memorandum that “FOIA…is the most prominent 
expression of a…national commitment to ensuring an open Government.”174  Further, he stressed 
that “[a] democracy requires accountability, and accountability requires transparency.”175  
Attorney General Eric H. Holder, Jr. also stated that “the [DOJ] will defend a denial of a FOIA 
request only if (1) the agency reasonably foresees that disclosure would harm an interest 
protected by one of the statutory exemptions, or (2) disclosure is prohibited by law.”176   
While the current administration favors disclosure, if the courts fail to recognize the 
susceptibility of the executive’s disclosure policy, it risks leaving “the public's right of access to 
government information inadequately protected.”177  Furthermore, it is imperative to the 
effectiveness of FOIA, that “[p]eople perceive the Court as making principled decisions, not 
political compromises.”178   
Based on the role speculativeness plays “in the nature of the FOIA judge’s task,”179 the 
more substantially supported conclusion is that the court should take a sliding-scale approach, 
with complete judicial deference to the government’s proffered reason that no waiver had 
occurred on one side, and no judicial deference on the other.  The judiciary’s role, therefore, will 
be to draw lines along the continuum based on an explicit number of factors.   
Given the uncertainty of a current administration’s discretionary disclosure policy, and 
the potential risk to the public’s interest, this proposed solution better complies with FOIA.  The 
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scale may be triggered during circumstances of excessive classification or times of national 
emergencies.   
D.  The Uncertain Role of Technology 
The role that technology will play in waiver litigation is not clear at this time.  For 
instance, “the Internet facilitates virtually perfect copying and nearly instantaneous transmission 
of material around the world.”180  Moreover, “information that is posted online is at one publicly 
available to millions of people on the Net.”181  Further, the “crawling, indexing and serving 
processes of search engines” now enable Internet users to enter a search query and immediately 
obtain a list of the most relevant pages.
182
   
The circumstances of prior disclosure will have to be viewed in light of technological 
innovations.  For example, the Internet will play a greater role in determining the public nature of 
the information and whether it is “freely available.”  Furthermore, the extent of dissemination 
must be analyzed in relation to the expansive nature of the Internet.   
Similarly, the lack of uniformity in adjudicating confidentiality waiver is of great 
significance when viewed in relationship to the Internet.  Citizens need to be able to rely on a 
standard that allows the public domain, by dispersing power through public rights of access, to 
effectively function as restraint against government power.
183
   “Withholding information vests 
unchecked control in the executive, creates a credibility gap between government and the 
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governed, and provides the Government with an opportunity to use ‘leaks' to disclose only as 
much information as it deems useful.”184 
Because FOIA enables the executive to continue “block[ing] legal means for the public to 
obtain information about government activities, especially concerning national security, a new 
model for transparency emerged: Wikileaks.” 185  Thus, “[i]n an environment where legally 
approved avenue to information about the government have been closed off, it’s no wonder that 
efforts like Wikileaks would emerge.” 186  More significantly, “[r]egardless of what happens to 
[the head of Wikileaks], a world where fewer FOIA requests are granted is a world with more 
Wikileaks.”187   
Therefore, in determining waiver in today’s technologically-evolving landscape, the more 
substantially supported conclusion is that courts should explicitly evaluate the nature and extent 
of the prior disclosure.  This will necessarily entail analyzing the practical effects of the prior 
disclosure as well as the hypothesized effects. 
 IV.  THE NEED FOR REFORMATION OF WAIVER DOCTRINE & PROPOSED SOLUTION  
In order to be more responsive to changing circumstances, such as differing 
administrative disclosure policies or the increasing role technology plays in the public domain 
context, the courts should explicitly adopt a multi-factored balancing test when determining 
whether an agency was waived confidentiality.  The factors the court should explicitly adopt are 
(1) the applicable exemption at issue; (2) the nature of the disclosure; and (3) the extent of the 
disclosure, taking into consideration the actual and hypothetical effects of that disclosure.  The 
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court should also adopt a sliding-scale approach upon which the government’s argument for 
nondisclosure will be assessed in light of the current Administration’s discretionary disclosure 
policy and any other extenuating circumstances.     
This proposed waiver standard is more in line with the legislature’s envisioned role that 
the judiciary would ensure “the effective operation of FOIA.”188  Since “[t]he overriding policy 
of the FOIA is to disclose whenever possible and to withhold only when necessary,” the court 
can better effectuate legislative intent by explicitly taking into account the purpose of the 
exemption in its analysis.
189
  As noted above, explicitly evaluating the purpose of the applicable 
exemption has already been supported by the Tenth Circuit in Prison Legal News v. Exec. Office 
for U.S. Att’ys.190   
Furthermore, as noted in the Ninth Circuit case of Mobile Oil Corp. v. U.S. E.P.A.,
191
 the 
court must properly address the issue of waiver without adversely impacting the agency’s 
conduct regarding discretionary disclosure.  The concern in holding that an agency has waived 
confidentiality is that the agency will be less likely to disclose any information in the future.  
Therefore, it is imperative that the court evaluate whether the interests covered by the exemption 
are still able to be protected.  This evaluation better captures the intent of the legislature in 
enacting FOIA to strike the balance between the public’s interest in disclosure and the 
government’s interest in protecting certain sensitive records. 
In addition, by explicitly evaluating the nature and extent of the disclosure, the court will 
better address the rationale underlying the public domain.  The public domain serves as a 
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structural restraint against the government.
192
  Complementary to the rationale underlying FOIA, 
the public domain serves as a check on governmental abuses that can occur with the 
concentration of power by dispersing power to control information ultimately and equally among 
the people.
193
  Whether requested information constitutes a “public thing,” however, is not easily 
discernible.   
Furthermore, the extent of the role that technology will play in determining whether 
something is “freely available” is unknown at this time.  This point was noted by the Second 
Circuit in referenced in Inner City Press/Cmty on the Move v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. 
Reserve Sys. 
194
  The courts, by explicitly taking into account these factors, will remain flexible 
to changing technologies, and ultimately result in more pragmatic outcomes.  
Therefore, in weighing the nature of the disclosure, the courts should look to the 
circumstances of its disclosure and the form of the disclosure.  Similarly, in weighing the extent 
of the disclosure, the courts should look to the actual and hypothetical dissemination of the 
information.  This approach is supported by Ninth Circuit’s hypothetical analysis in Watkins v. 
U.S. Bureau of Customs and Border Protection.
195
  Further, while contrary to D.C. Circuit’s 
explicit ruling in Cottone v. Reno,
196
 it is in line with court’s articulated rationale for the public 
domain doctrine.
197
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Moreover, this approach will most likely result in fairer outcomes.  For instance, under 
the public domain doctrine, the courts were required to determine whether information was 
“freely available” and “permanently” in the public domain.  Such line-drawing may result in 
arbitrary outcomes, making illusory the doctrine’s promise of certainty and predictably. 198  In 
particular, this approach will better enable the judiciary to respond to countervailing concerns 
which may be present due to recent circumstances, such as different Administrations or national 
security concerns. 
These interests, however, must be viewed through a critical lens, with the court picking a 
point on a spectrum.  While a balancing or sliding-scale approach has been previously articulated 
in wavier case law, it has not been explicitly adopted by all the circuits.  In explicitly adopting 
this method of analysis, the judiciary will “make visible and accountable the inevitable weighing 
process that rules obscure.”199   
VI.  CONCLUSION  
Waiver analysis under FOIA is necessarily fact-specific.  A balancing or sliding-scale 
approach, implicitly supported by case law, requires judges to consider all the facts, the context, 
and determine from the whole picture whether the government has waived confidentiality.  By 
explicitly adopting this approach, however, courts will add an element of predictability and 
uniformity that had previously been absent under waiver analysis.  Moreover, this approach best 
facilitates the drawing out the commonalities and differences in the approaches taken by the 
D.C., Second, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits.  This method of analysis also is the most responsive to 
the number of competing values underlying FOIA litigation.  In particular, the court must 
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explicitly take into account (1) the purpose of the exemption, (2) the nature of the disclosure, and 
(3) the extent of the disclosure.  This flexible, balancing or sliding-scale analysis, guided by three 
factors, works as a substantive compromise between “the right of the citizenry to know what the 
Government is doing, and the legitimate but limited need for secrecy to maintain effective 
operation of the Government.”200 
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